The paper starts with the premise that the basic requirement of an Islamic economic system is that decisions pass through an Islamic filter. It is shown that the requirement of a moral filter is not unique to Islamic economic systems. The objective of the paper is to examine whether, given a system of values that enter explicitly into the economic policy framework, it is possible for society to implement such a constrained program and be able to compete in a highly competitive world environment with accelerating technological change, while maintaining the viability of such an econo-ethical system. The Islamic ethical axioms developed by Naqvi are used as a point of departure for the analysis. In this framework, it is possible to differentiate between the development of the ethical system as axioms, and the derivation of policies. The systems of zakat and Islamic banking, for example, are viewed as tools in the context of the higher level of the ethical axioms. The role of government and governance and the related Islamic concept of Umma are shown to be basic for system viability but vary depending on context. After discussing the ethical foundation of an Islamic economic system, three case studies are examined: Iran, Kuwait and Singapore. Singapore provides an example of a non-Islamic society that is faced with the same dilemma. The paper concludes that an economy with an imposed ethical filter is an economy experiencing an enduring or political disequilibrium that is more or less permanent and that can only be maintained by direct controls. In such an economy, decisions whether economic or noneconomic, will continue to pass through the ethical filter at minimum cost to politics and welfare, as long as the economic system is able to compete favorably with other systems, providing net economic gains to society, and the distribution of these gains are perceived as equitable by the government and the governed.
J vo vl,I,.oJl,9,.,og.a, °x,.,I S,Lcti.51 PLJai PLsJ ar.,l..,'I alojL....oJI `jo aila a9, 9Ji Naqvi (1994, p. 2), the challenge facing economic analysis in an Islamic framework is "to show that bringing ethical considerations, which are based on religion, explicitly into the economic calculus in no way fetters the spirit of inquiry." This is not a simple challenge. The history of scientific and social development indicates that it has been a difficult, if not impossible, task to differentiate between a system of scientific laws and a system of ethical principles (Braithwaite 1950) .
Economic policy must, in the final analysis, deal with an economic system. But any economic system "requires a set of rules, an ideology to justify them, and a conscience in the individual that makes him strive to carry them out" (Robinson 1962, p. 11) . In the case of market capitalism, the prevailing ideology has been portrayed succinctly by Robinson as a system where "values which can be measured in terms of money are the only ones that ought to count" (ibid., p. 141). In materialistic socialism, individuals melt into a collective whole with guaranteed entitlements. Individual motivations and the drive for personal achievement are highly constrained and lack legitimacy in a purely materialistic socialist system. The ethical system of an Islamic society may be placed between these two extremes. It attempts to provide a balance between individual freedom and motivations, and their social obligations.
In all three systems, the role of government and governance is pivotal to system viability and sustainability over time. The recent collapse of the former Soviet Union with its system of materialistic socialism for example, has been blamed on the inability of the system to produce the type of government and governance that is responsive, adaptive and efficient. What Marx diagnosed as an inevitable collapse of capitalism because of class contradiction and confrontation seems to have been mirrored in his own materialistic socialist system as a contradiction between government and governance. Democratic governments in market capitalistic societies, on the other hand, have illustrated in practice a large degree of vitality and adaptability but seem indifferent to many of the social ills a free market system creates.
Taming the wild market mechanism, so to speak, by forcing its activities to pass through a moral filter to minimize its negative externalities, such as severe inequalities, the degeneration of social values or the spread of crime and human alienation, while maintaining individual dynamism and achievement, as the system of Islamic economics aspires to do, is clearly a desirable universal goal. However, the application of an economic system based on the Islamic moral filter in the present state of world development, at the dawn of the 20th century, is recent and has not as yet passed the test of time. The applications of Islamic economics are largely in the experimental stage, and there seems to be more than one experiment going on. The present paper attempts to elucidate some of the conditions and factors that shape the development of such experiments, and to illustrate that the issue of maintaining a moral filter is not unique to Islamic economics. It is a universal problem.
The literature on the subject of Islam, society and economic policy is extensive and wide ranging.' I neither have the capacity nor the space to even begin summarizing that body of literature. What I intend to do is to give an outline of a basic set of rules that characterizes an Islamic social system, the motivational forces that make that system function, and the type of government and governance required to operationally interpret and enforce the rules.
The search for a basic set of rules, that characterizes the moral system of Islam and that is logically sufficient to represent the diverse interpretations of Islamic ethical principles, to act as a moral filter and accordingly guide economic policies in Islamic societies, is basic to the present discussion. This is clearly a formidable task that goes beyond the knowledge boundaries of the present author. Fortunately, there are other pioneers in the field. AlShakaa (1994) in his classic book on Islam without Factions (Mazahib) lists and discusses in detail more than twelve major factions in Islamic history and illustrates that although they represent varied views in Islamic government and practice, a common thread cuts across their ideas. The work of Naqvi (1994) is important to this part of the discussion. Developed independently with different objectives and not even quoted in his work, the work of Naqvi (1994) essentially takes Al-Shakaa's tentative argument to its logical conclusion. Aside from his pioneering axiomatic approach, which provides much needed clarity to the discussion in this field and gives credence and formality to Al-Shakaa's conjecture, it is Naqvi's insistence that Islamic economics be viewed, like any other economic doctrine, as "an idealization of reality, and relative to the nature of society" (Naqvi 1994, p. xx) , that sets his work apart. The real test of an Islamic economic system is whether or not it "can be implemented and can better tackle specific economic issues. It is essential to leave enough room for discussion and dissent instead of suppressing freedom of thought and expression in the name of religion. For Islam to become the source of a new intellectual paradigm, it should be freed t Fortunately, there have been recent and important contributions to the subject that present both systematic analyses as well as differing views. These include, among others, the work of Ahmad (1976) , Naqvi (1994 Naqvi ( , 1993 Naqvi ( , 1981 Naqvi ( , 1981b , Sadr (1982) , Nasr (1979) , Qutb (1976) , Kuran (1994 Kuran ( , 1989 Kuran ( , 1986 , Al-Shakaa (1995) , AlMusawi (1987) , Al-Imam (1993) , Arrow (1985) , Gibb (1968) , Gibb and Kramers(1961) , Haque (1985) , Hossain (1988) , Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987) , Khan and Mirakhor (1990), Mawdudi (1976) , Nasr (1979) , Siddiqi (1981) , and references cited there-in. Russell's Freedom versus Organization: 1814 -1914 (1934 presents an account of the struggle in Western thought during the 19th century that has relevance to the present discussion. Also, chapter 10 in Russell (1972) What needs scrutiny and careful analysis is the survival probability of the system's value parameters as the system opens up, interacts and competes with other systems. Experience with systems' chances of survival indicates that they are not independent of their adaptive capacity, their development records, the size and the degree of equity in the distribution of the provision of their entitlement system, and whether such provisions are part of a long-term sustainable development strategy, or are designed to gain short-term (or short-sighted) system legitimacy.
II. ON THE FOUNDATION OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS
Islamic economics is based on the four main pillars that characterize an Islamic society: (1) the ethical value system derived from Islamic principles (Islamic Bill of Rights and Obligations), (2) the system's operative rules derived from the ethical system and which serve as the basis for managing the system (laws and regulations in an Islamic society), (3) the expected behavior of the representative microeconomics agents, whether individuals, households or firms, especially with reference to general conformity to the system's ethical principles and operative rules (the extent of needed enforcement), and (4) From these ethical axioms, Naqvi derives a set of rules for economic behavior and policy, the general objective of which is to lead society along a path bounded by Islamic ethics as expounded by the four axioms. The purpose of the set of rules derived from the four basic axioms is to maintain a balance between a person and his/her environment, to achieve a just balance between today's and tomorrow's consumption, and to maintain an equitable distribution of wealth and income. These rules attempt to provide a framework for policy, 7 Kuran (1994, p. 3), puts the prohibition of interest as the most fundamental of the characteristics of an Islamic economy, followed by zakat and then the moral filter. In the context of the present framework, Kuran's ranking seems to confuse means with ends.
but leave a large domain from which to choose appropriate policy tools, and to experiment and evaluate the appropriateness of their impact. An Islamic society may set a development objective of increasing per capita welfare. The development objective(s) must not only conform to the four axioms, but also the policy tools should not violate these axioms as well. For example, systems of income transfers or profit sharing are basically tools for policy, the purpose of which may be viewed as to achieve economic growth objectives subject to the axioms of Unity, Equilibrium, Free Will and Responsibility. Policy evaluation should consider the outcome of economic policies in the context of their effect on the integrity of the society's ethical system.
The axiomatic system with its derivative rules clarifies the ethical foundation of Islamic economics and provide for a systematic discussion of the subject. However, there are major challenges in translating a value-driven economic policy into practice. Operationally, policy makers need at their disposal a stable political and jurisprudence system that is supported by an elaborate information system able to monitor the results of policy packages. These results need to be evaluated with reference to their narrow economic, and wider social and ethical consequences.
Some of the required information implies difficult conceptual and measurement problems that could be costly to initiate and maintain, and difficult to interpret if the ethical criteria are not clear or the interpretation changes over time, or worse yet, changes with changes in government or governance (lack of isonomy)8.
On Islamic Government
There is disagreement as to what constitutes an optimal Islamic government.9 The debate is neither new nor unique to Islamic societies. However, focusing on the historical evolution of Islamic societies does not seem to provide a good guide for an ideal Islamic government.'0 Going back in Islamic history, the period that resembles most closely the present state of Islamic societies (Umnra), seems to be that of the Second Abbasid Dynasty (Al-aasr AlAbbasi Al-thani). The Umma of Islam at that time, which comprised different races and with different backgrounds, and which extended from South and East Asia to Turkey and Spain in the southern parts of Europe and was unified only by the culture and ethical values of Islam, was disintegrating in both government and ethics.
During that period of history, the vast Umma was disintegrating into small nonviable states. The governments of the various states were, on the whole, very corrupt and inefficient, and almost always at war. Rulers of the newly independent states formed alliances with enemies of the Umma in their continuous wars among themselves, while they continued to maintain 8 For the meaning of isonomy and as it relates to democracy, see Hayek (1955) . 9 The initial definition of an Islamic government was based on choice by representation (mobaiaa) of a ruler or an Imam who governs according to the application of principles derived from the Holy Kuran and the Sunna (statements or actions of the Prophet). That system included an accepted set of rules that regulated the ruler's and laity's rights and obligations. It included the embryo of modern constitutional government (Khomeini 1969/70) . However, this transparent procedure for establishing the rules of government and governance evolved into varied interpretations that went to extremes. Some gave an almost sacred status to the Imam as having absolute authority (Al-Shakaa 1994, pp. 216-232) , while others introduced inheritance into the system of government. For more details see, Al-Shakaa (1994) and Al-Musawi (1987) (Al Shakaa 1994; Hussain 1974; Russell 1945) . Hussain (1974) argues that the flourishing of arts and science in the midst of the declining morality and government was a result of competition among the rulers of the various states of the Umma for glory, power and legitimacy. In spite of the presence of many fertile minds, development in science and ethics did not seem to merge and emerge as a prime engine for sustained economic and political development.
III. ILLUSTRATIONS

Iran
In his Islamic Government, Khomeini (1969 Khomeini ( /1970 enrollment rates for both sexes increased from 72 to 109% (for females from 52 to 104%), and secondary school enrollment rates increased from 27 to 57% (for females from 18 to 49%), while tertiary education tripled between 1980 and 1992, reaching 12%. Urbanization has been growing by 5% since 1970, but 47% of the population were classified as rural in 1993. Fertility, although declining, is still high with a total fertility rate of 4.9 in 1993 compared to 6.7 in 1970. The average annual growth rate of the population is close to 3% per year, and while growth is expected to decline as fertility continues to decline, the present young age structure of the population will guarantee a high rate of growth in the working age population for at least four more decades. It is evident that Iran has been able to achieve a high degree of social development in health and education during the past two decades. I will not get into a debate of whether these social improvements were a continuation of efforts started before the Islamic Revolutionary Regime or have been part of the legitimization process of the new regime. A recent evaluation of human resources development in the Islamic Republic of Iran indicated that the Revolutionary Regime made remarkable contributions to the health status of the various segments of the society, instituted a strong family planning program and made a serious commitment to basic and higher education for both genders (World Bank 1991).
Human resources development has also been promoted in similar oil economies. The presence of rental income, and the fact that expenditure on human development, when broadly defined, does not create a conflict with ethical values should facilitate public spending in this sector. However, given the high rate of population growth, maintaining the same level of per capita investment on human resources development should require increasing resources. As oil revenue declines, investments in human resources will be guided more by the expected economic returns on these investments. These returns depend critically on the success of efforts to promote the demand for human resources. Promoting the demand required for the increasing supply of human capital is a necessary condition for sustainable economic development in Iran. In an economically integrated world system, where both capital and labor are mobile, an increase in the demand for national human resources implies increased integration in the world system. The demand for human resources is becoming increasingly globalized and will seek the most efficient labor and the environment that is conducive to foreign investment. Did the introduction of the filter of Islamic ethical rules of conduct to market behavior promote or constrain economic development? Did the promotion of economic development compromise any of the ethical axioms? Are there external factors that affected the potential for economic development? These are some of the questions that need to be answered in order to assess economic performance in Iran as an example of an Islamic economies.
The answer to the first question is mixed. Between 1980 and 1993, the average annual growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP), at 2.6%, was lower than the rate of population growth. However, during the same period the growth rates of the agriculture, industry and manufacturing sectors (4.6, 4.6, and 6.0% respectively) exceeded that of population growth. The service sector was almost stagnant, with an average annual growth rate of less than 1%, although it employed 46% of the labor force in 1986. In 1993, Iran's merchandise exports were valued at US $16.7 billions, with 93% being fuel and minerals (compared to 90% in 1970), while its imports were valued at $30.7 billions, with a sizable proportion going to military equipment that year. The deficit in the country's current account balance increased from US $507 to US $3,765 million between 1970 and 1993. Total external debt increased from US $4.5 to $20.6 billion between 1980 and 1993. The net present value of external debt as a percent of exports (93% oil) increased from 45 to 106%.
The economic indicators highlighted above do not represent a positive development trend.
Some of the apparent difficulties could be related to the freeze on Iran's assets in the West, to the long war with Iraq and to the embargo imposed by the United States. Other factors could be internal and include the types of economic policies being implemented. It is difficult to assess the relative importance of these factors, given the data at hand. Iran's leadership seems to give more weight to the external factors being responsible for the economic difficulties. This argument may be labeled the "conspiracy argument." The conspiracy argument indicates that a successful development in Iran means the success of an ideology in competition with that of Western atomistic market capitalism. Such success is not acceptable in the present structure of world power. It implies a loss of the surplus that is being extracted by the West from the oil economies and other parts of the developing world. The system of capitalism, in this view, will respond in various ways to defend its present level of net gains in the oil region of the Gulf. In Iran's case, the response was the present policies against Iran. The conspiracy argument, indicates further that the issue is not only one of preserving net gains for the atomistic system of capitalism, it goes much deeper as a confrontation between two major civilizations. Without a moral filter to guide market behavior, the atomistic system of Western market capitalism may need continuous conflict to ensure its internal social unity, legitimacy and ultimate survival. As a conflict between two major civilizations the concept of Umma comes to the forefront. To Iran, Western capitalism represents itself as an Umma. Accordingly, countries like Iran that seek an independent path should expect resistance and should counteract, not as individual countries but as an Umma.. In such circumstances, conflict seems inevitable.12 A counter argument could be made that atomistic market capitalism may not need to defend itself. Its most important defense could be the built-in contradictions in the competing systems. This has been the case with the socialist experiment in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. I cannot provide a systemic evaluation of whether or not the presence of the Islamic moral filter in the governance of Iran has adversely affected its economic development potential. Only time, with more elaborate analysis, will tell.
The last question raised above relates to whether or not development efforts in the Islamic
Republic of Iran resulted in a divergence from the basic ethical axioms. Some indicators 12 The inevitability of conflict is equally perceived by the West. According to Huntington (1993, pp. 1985 and 1990 . Although the percent of poor is higher in East and South Asia, it did not increase during that period. Again it is difficult to conclude whether these indicators represent a basic change in philosophy away from strict adherence to the Islamic ethical axioms of equilibrium and responsibility, or are only a temporal adjustment associated with the nature of development strategy being implemented? Even then, to maintain its stability (isonomy), the ethical filter should indicate how much inequity is allowed in society, as a cost for development, and how the losers will be compensated?
Kuwait
The complexity and interactive nature of the role of government, the international system, and the structure of society, the basic resource endowments and the potential development of an Islamic economic system are best illustrated by the examples of some of the Gulf countries. The purpose is to illustrate that the development of an Islamic system of government with its four ethical axioms is not necessarily compatible with the presence of oil that provides a sizable stream of rent for many generations. On the contrary, the presence of a sizable rental income could present an obstacle to reaching an equilibrium between the requirements of the ethical value system and the requirements for sustained economic growth. Some of these issues have been discussed in the case of Iran. Kuwait, however, is a much smaller country and provides a contrast with the case of Singapore.
The oil economies of the Arab Gulf countries have special characteristics of their own. They are small in size but rich in oil. Oil revenue serves as the basis for financing the requirements of economic sustenance and growth. Their economic and social impact far exceed their small size. They have taken an active role in promoting Islamic societies and Islamic economics.
For example, Saudi Arabia has developed various centers for the study of Islamic ethics and Islamic economics around the world. Saudi Arabia, being the custodian of the holiest Islamic sites, presents a special and important case study that deserves an independent analysis all by itself. Other Arab governments in oil economies, present Islam as a belief and a means for governance legitimacy. The present discussion will focus on the case of Kuwait. The purpose is to illustrate the conceptual problem, and not to evaluate the empirical context of the country's development planning experience or suggest alternative development scenarios. For these issues, the reader is referred to Sirageldin and Khorshid (1995) .
Kuwait is a small country, in both population and area, with large oil reserves. Its revenue from oil exports has far exceeded its absorptive capacity for many years. It was able to generate a vast reserve fund that has been invested abroad. It embarked on an ambitious human resources development program that provided free health care and education to all its citizens. It has the highest score in the United Nations Human Resources Development Index among all the Arab countries and one of the highest scores in the world. It has invested heavily in its infrastructure, and for that purpose imported a large number of expatriate labor that greatly outnumbered its own labor force. On all counts, and excluding the effect of the 1990 Iraqi invasion, based on its social statistics, Kuwait should be a showcase of successful development. It may not qualify as adhering fully to the four ethical axioms underlying Islamic economics, but it should have been a close candidate. It is my view, however, that indicators of development in Kuwait have been somewhat misleading. Many of the indicators do not reveal imbalances that are embedded in the basic structure of the economy. These imbalances have risen to the forefront of the policy agenda in recent years, although they have been clearly signaling their presence for more than a decade. These imbalances include: the emergence of a chronic budget deficit, the presence of unemployment among Kuwaiti and expatriate labor, and the mismatch between new entrants to the labor force and labor requirements.
Kuwait has had no shortage of economic advice to help ascertain how to deal with these emerging problems, including advice from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in addition to other distinguished economic and financial consultants and consulting firms. As discussed in Sirageldin and Khorshid (1995) , most of the prescriptions have been conventional packages that could have been prescribed to countries with completely different resource endowments and economic structures, say the Sudan, Pakistan, Egypt or Brazil. These policy packages include reducing the size of the public sector through privatization (which is also argued would have the benefit of overall production efficiency), and reducing the public deficit through measures of cost recovery and the reduction of entitlements. These measures seem to be based on an inadequate understanding of the role of government in the context of oil economies, and an inadequate specification of the country's basic developmental needs and priorities. In the context of an oil economy, where oil revenue represents between 80 and 90% of the government's revenue, it is the government that, de facto, takes the initiative in almost all spheres of socioeconomic activities. The challenge, is how a government with large economic size and power will be able to complete the necessary development transformation of an oil economy by building a non-oil production base, that essentially reduces its power and control?
The basic developmental challenge, under the condition of the government being the major force in initiating and guiding economic growth, is how to transform the economy away from oil and how to engage the growing labor force in productive, sustainable employment, while maintaining its legitimacy and authority. As will be evident, there are major contradictory forces in play. These forces include the role of the government in such circumstances, the type of democratic participation necessary to legitimize the ethical axioms and the social contract required to maintain legitimacy, and the role of external interests in influencing government behavior, especially if these interests view oil as being vital to their own development needs and to the survival of their current industrial bases. To establish the link between these complex dynamic forces and the institution of an Islamic economic system, in the case of Kuwait, we need to dig deeper into the structure of Kuwait's economy and its sociopolitical system.13 As mentioned earlier, Kuwait like other Gulf countries, is totally dependent on oil for its survival. This pattern of a rental economy, which is familiar by now to those dealing with economic analyses in that region, creates special internal and external political characteristics. 13 For more details, see Sirageldin and Khorhid (1995) .
These characteristics impede the introduction of necessary reform. For years, the basic development philosophy of Kuwait has been based on the time-honored tribal code of ethics: of continuously attempting to strike a balance between government legitimacy and citizen entitlements for present and future generations. Entitlements, as part of a generous social contract, has included not only high levels of consumption and human resources development but also employment guarantees. As discussed elsewhere (Sirageldin and Khorshid 1995) , a social contract that is based on a system that guarantees both income and employment, and that continues to depend mainly on the returns of an exhaustive resource base, cannot be sustained for long. It leads inevitably to social and political imbalances and unrest. More obviously, if maintained at the same per capita level of expenditure, it must lead to budget deficit. In the face of high rates of population growth, and in the absence of viable non-oil production, a reduction in entitlements, for the purpose of reducing the deficit, will only postpone the growth of the deficit and the potential collapse of the fiscal system. This is indeed a tautological statement. What does not necessarily follow is the lack of serious development in non-oil production in spite of the apparent achievement in education and health care. It should be equally evident that privatization policies or the reduction of the size of the public sector cannot lead to sustainable economic growth under the existing conditions. First, with the exception of service activities such as electricity and water, there is no significant non-oil public production to privatize. Second, the size of the government cannot be reduced as long as non-oil production is not developed. It is evident from the nature of the country's resource endowment that there is no escape from a sizable and leading role for the government in this early and vital stage of the development transformation in oil economies. The challenge is not to reduce the size of the government. The challenge is rather in redefining the role of government and governance to be able to initiate a true transformation away from oil.
The Role of Government in an Oil Economy
The role of government in an oil economy is fundamentally different from that in other economies. It is the discovery of oil that transforms the role of government into its present status. Oil made the government the employer of society as opposed to being employed by the production base of the society through a true fiscal system, that allows for a viable broad based system of taxation. Such system can only exist in the presence of sustainable non-oil production. In the absence of such fiscal system, one of the Islamic ethical axioms--mutual responsibility between the government and the governed--becomes conceptually and operationally inoperative. It is possible that such mutual responsibility could exist because of the presence of an enlightened leadership, but it will not have a solid foundation and will lack stability.
Fiscal Policy and Islamic Axioms
With the inevitable rise of the deficit and in the absence of a true tax base, the allocation of dwindling oil revenue among competing needs becomes more difficult and more subject to the power of interest groups rather than the collective good. Another ethical axiom becomes strained, that of responsibility. The allocation of oil revenue may favor the present consumption of existing generations, leading to greater apparent deficit and inter-generation inequity--violating the axiom of equilibrium. The result is another round of policies that attempt to reduce current spending, thus reduce mutual confidence between the government and the governed. Accordingly, alliance between the organizational base of the society and the international oil demand establishment becomes increasingly important. Such alliances will attempt to solve short-term disequilibria as opposed to making serious commitments to long-term sustainable development efforts. Postponing long-term reform will aggravate the situation and make future implementation more painful.14 Policies attempting to reduce the budget deficit through privatization or a reduction of entitlements, in the absence of serious efforts to develop non-oil production, will only lead to the development of narrow interest groups and the segmentation of society. The result of reduced entitlements may lead to increased inequality both intra-and inter-generationlly, in violation of the basic axioms of Unity and Equilibrium.
It is evident that the role of government is pivotal in promoting a sustained development process in oil economies. The absence of built-in mutual responsibility makes the government's task even greater and more challenging. Kuwait has been successful in maintaining legitimacy through short-term entitlement measures. It has not succeeded in the development of a long-term policy to develop a sustainable demand for its growing human capital that is independent from the revenue of its non-renewable resource. It seems difficult to perceive of a set of ethical axioms that could survive in the absence of a competitive and viable production base.
Singapore
The case of Singapore is examined briefly to illustrate that many of the issues discussed in the context of Islamic societies are not unique to these societies. Singapore, an island of three million, has achieved remarkable growth in less than two decades. According to the World Development Report of the World Bank (1995) , its gross national product (GNP) per capita rose from US $2,880 in 1979 to US $6,620 in 1985, and US $19,850 in 1995. Singapore's per capita GNP in 1995 is slightly larger than that of Kuwait (US $19, 360 ). Singapore's GNP growth has been one of the highest in the world. It grew by an average annual rate of 8.3% between 1970 and 1980 and 6.5 between 1980 and 1993 filter for atomistic market economies--a system that implies more active government. The economic cost of introducing the ethical filter, nevertheless must be lower than the perceived benefit to society.
The role of government in the development of Islamic societies varies depending on context. The existence of an Umma government is not clear and could be counter-productive, partly because the concept of Umma is not well defined, and partly because it is threatening to other sovereign countries. The case of Iran illustrates that potential threat. Islamic governments should focus on building a human resource base that is internationally competitive.
There are Islamic economies that are highly dependent on rental income from oil, an exhaustible resource. In such economies, the role of the government is different. It has a major presence in almost all economic and social spheres, and becomes the main vehicle for development. However, the structure of such economies introduces contradictory elements to its political systems, the mutual enforcement of the ethical axioms, and relations with the international system. These contradictions make such economies more vulnerable to shortterm shocks, but the same contradictions present short-term solutions to issues that require long term attention. The results, in many instances reduce the potential for sustainable development and restrain the social contract that exist between the government and the governed. But the potential for sustainable development and the integrity of the social contract are two essential prerequisites for an ethical moral filter to be sustained.
The case of Singapore illustrates that a small society can build itself into an economic world power while maintaining, through strict controls, its own system of ethical values. This is done through long-term investment in human resources, the promotion of a strong anticorruption value system in both the public and private spheres, a successful economic program, and above all, mutual trust between the government and the population.
To conclude, an economy with an imposed ethical filter is, to use Meade's terminology, an economy experiencing an enduring or political disequilibrium that is more or less permanent and that can only be maintained by direct controls (Machlup 1967, pp. 66-68) . Accordingly, in an economy driven by ethical rules, decisions whether economic or non-economic, will continue to pass through the ethical filter at a minimum cost to politics and welfare, as long as the system is able to compete favorably with other systems, provide net gains to society, and the distribution of the system's output is perceived as fair by both the government and the governed. As the discussion in the present paper has attempted to illustrate, perceived fairness depends on both degree of participation in the interpretation of the ethical rules (i.e., democracy), and the stability of their application (i.e., isonomy).
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